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technology Choice. Employment and Growth*

Granted that overall LOO growth performance in the 60 1 s was substan
tially ahead of that in the 50 1 s, there can be little doubt that the big
gest crisis lies just ahead.

This is so partly because as more and more

people are beginning to recognize, that progress has been very unevenly dis
tributed, and partly because the threat is for much more of the same in the
70 1 s and 80's.

Perhaps the most important manifestation of that uneven

participation in the past is that, even in the fastest growing countries,
unemployment and underemployment rates have been rising.

Secondly, all

available guesstimates and projections for the future seem to agree that
even if population growth could be substantially dampened tomorrow, given
the age structure of the present LDC population, a labor force explosion
of major proportions must be expected over the next decade or so.

1

Add to

this the fact that the volume of foreign aid and of foreign private capital
both available and acceptable in the 70's--in spite of all hopes, pleas, and
efforts to the contrary--is likely to fall substantially below that of the
60 1 s and the true dimensions of the problem ahead become clear.

If major

political as well as economic crises are to be avoided, it is thus reasonable
to assert not only that the LDC's are going to have to somehow solve their
future output problem not at the expense of employment and distribution, but
also that this will have to be accomplished largely by their own efforts.
During the so•s and early 60 1 s most of the LDC's engaged in what has
been called, in short-hand, import substitution policies.

This usually

*Paper prepared for the ILO conference in Geneva in July 1970.
1
For example, even Taiwan, one of the more "successful" planned
parenthood cases, which experienced 1. 7% and 2.5% annual average increases
in the labor force during 1 58- 1 59 and 1 60- 1 61, respectively, is experiencing
increases of nearly 4% now and projecting annual increases between 3.5%
and 3.7% for the 70's.
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included in one package a by now well-known Gyndrome of policies:

exchange

controls and import licensing, budget deficits, overvalued exchange rates
and low (sometimes negative) real interest rates.

The aim, generally

speaking, was to redirect pre-independence traditional colonial flows in
favor of the creation of social and economic overheads, and of import re
placing consumer goods industries.

The consequences of this set of policies

on economic performance have by now been fairly well recognized and acknow
ledged, i.e. a spurt in industrial growth but inefficient, i.e. capital
and import-intensive, in character, accompanied by a discouragement of ex
ports and agricultural output, low domestic saving rates, a relatively heavy
dependence on foreign aid, and low rates of technological change.
As LDC governments became increasingly aware of the economic cost
of these policies, one could observe, during the 60's, a growing tendency
to move towards a new policy package.

This package can be characterized,

if at the cost of some oversimplification, as tending to reduce some of the
gross inefficiencies attending industrial development by readjusting a num
ber of crucial, previously distorted, relative prices, including the exchange
rate, the interest rate and the internal terms of trade.

By replacing

quantitative controls in the foreign exchange market with tariffs and
moving towards more realistic exchange rates, via either a de jure or~
facto devaluation, replacing severe credit rationing with higher interest
rates, and forced procurement of food at artificially low prices with a re
latively free market, developmental access and participation could be
offered to medium and small-scale entrepreneurs in both agriculture and
industry for the first time~

The effects of this type of restructuring,

where it has occurred, at least part of the way, e.g,,, in Korea, Taiwan and
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Pakistan, have indeed been remarkable in turning situations of virtual stag•
nation in the

1

50 1 s into sustained growth situations in the

1

60's.

More specifically, once agriculture is no longer discriminated
against by unfavorable terms of trade this sector can begin to play its his
torical role of generating surpluses which, when successfully channeled,
can provide simultaneous employment opportunities for the unskilled labor
being released; a more broadly based industrial development pattern using a
relatively more domestic material and labor-intensive technology can emerge;
exports--especially of the non-traditional labor-using variety--are no longer
discriminated against and can begin to expand; domestic saving rates can
move up into the Rostow take-off range; and indigenous technological change

.
1
can assume muc h greater importance.
Perhaps most important from our point of view here is the fact
that the new signals induce the adoption of different, more labor-using and
unemployment reducing, technologies and output mixes.

In this context the

vital role, for better or worse, of technological flows between rich and
poor countries must be kept in mind.

The very coexistence of countries at

very different levels of technology undoubtedly represents one of the most
important influences on the performance of LDC's, past, present and prospec
tive.

It is the precise nature of these technological flows and the way in

which they have been accommodated by LDC's which has, in our view, had a
decisive impact on overall performance during these past two decades of
development.

Alternatively put, it is also in this area where the greatest

potential for improved LDC performance in the 70 1 s can and must be located.
1For a fuller discussion of the typical import substitution phase
in LDC development and of the transition to a more efficiency-oriented phase,
see the author's "Relative Prices in Planning for Economic Development,"
NBER volume, to be published,
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The move, beginning in the middle

1 60's,

from an import substitution

to an export-substitution dominated growth pattern--and the consequent marked
changes in economic performance--is, today, however, still the exception,
not the rule, as far as the less developed world as a whole is concerned.
In spite of the demonstrations of what can, in fact, be accomplished, there
remain formidable obstacles to the dismantling of the import substitution
regime.

Direct controls imply absolute power--as well as supplementary in

comes--for the civil service which it is loath to surrender lightly.

More

over, the inevitably greater role for private enterprise under any liberalized
regime runs up against associations with colonialism and fears of antisocial give-aways.
In addition to this pull of vested interests and some quite well
intentioned doubts concerning the general risks of liberalization, there
remains a good deal of skepticism concerning the major role we have accorded
here to technological change as a determinant of success in development.
In particular, many LDC officials, aid donors, and scholars share the point
of view that most technological change, especially in non-agriculture, must
take place abroad, and that the borrowing LDC's, in fact, have only a very
narrow set of technological choices open to them.

If only the coefficients

attaching to the latest vintage machinery produced in the advanced

countries are relevant, all the talk about alternative factor proportions

in response to alternative resource endowments becomes largely irrelevant-
or restricted to changes in output mixes via trade.
Skepticism on both these points, the merits of abandoning import
substitution and the scope of technological choice, is, of course, not un
related; for if there is no real alternative to the large scale capital-intensive

industrial structure, perhaps the most powerful argument for changing the
basic policy package loses much of its force.

The rest of the paper will

therefore concentrate on presenting, in Section II, a suggested more realis
tic view of the nature of the innovation process in the borrowing developing

countries.

The empirical relevancy of this view is then explored in

Section III.

There is less doubt now than ever before that the success of a
development effort is likely to be much more related to technological change
than to the growth of physical inputs.

Nevertheless, in spite of this

acknowledged importance of technological change, it has been difficult to
achieve a clear understanding of the process by which innovations are
actually made in a typical developing or borrowing country.
First, and foremost, it must be remembered that, unlike in an ad
vanced country where technological change is viewed as rather automatic and
routinized, or as capable of being generated through Rand D expenditures
according to some rules of cost/benefit analysis, we know that in the con
temporary developing societies technological change cannot either be taken
for granted or afforded through Rand D allocations.

In this situation we

cannot avoid the question of what: given the existence of a shelf of tech
nology from abroad, is the pattern by which the typica 1 less developed
economy, in fact, manages to innovate.

This question in turn forces us to

look at least at the following dimensions more carefully~

1) the precise

nature of that technology s~elf; 2) the availability within the LDC's of

-6required initial managerial and entrepreneurial capacity; and 3) the changing
nature of that required managerial and entrepreneurial capacity in the
course of transition to modern growth.
The technology shelf developed in the mature industrial economies
abroad may be described by a set of unit activities following a smooth
envelop curve as in Diagram I.

A particular technology can be described

by an L-shaped contour producing one unit of output with a given pair of
capital and labor coefficients.

The technology shelf is composed of the com

plete set of such activities or technologies which have been demonstrated
to be feasible somewhere in the advanced countries at some historical point
in time, including the present.

Since there exists a number of technology

exporting countries, e.g., the U.S., Germany, U.K., Japan, with continuous
technological transfers amongst themselves as well as with the LDC's,
it is not unreasonable to postulate the existence of a single technological
shelf for the lending world as a whole.

For example, unit technology A

0

may have been generated in Germany in 1920, A in the U.S. in 1920, A2 in
1

the U.S. in 1950, etc.

In other words, as we move to the left along the

shelf we run into more modern technology, i.e. technology of more recent
vintage and of higher capital intensity.

As capital per head increases

this means that the typical workers has learned to cooperate with more
units of capital of increasing technical complexity.

This capital deepening

process, in other words, is more complicated than the textbook version of
"hornog,eneous" labor being equipped with more units of "homogeneous" capital.
At any point in time the typica 1 LDC is then theoretically free to
borrow a particular unit activity from anywhere along this shelf.

What

technology is chosen and what happens as an immediate and ultimate consequence

J
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-7of that choice, i.e. what secondary processes and reactions are set off,
is, of course, all part and parcel of the innovational process taken as a
whole.

The quality of that process, each step of the way, in turn depends

on the nature of the entrepreneurial, managerial and skilled labor capacity
of the borrower.
The role of innovation must thus be seen as intimately related to
the stage in which the developing economy finds itself.

In other words,

the role of technological change in output and employment generation must
be viewed as sensitive to the same discernable phases of growth as the
economy moves in transition from open agrarianism to Kuznets' modern economic
growth.

In the first post-independence or import substitution phase, pre•

viously described, an effort is made to increase the supply of domestic en
trepreneurship and the economy's learning capacity, partly through the im
portation of people via aid, but mainly through the system of protection
established by government policies.

In fact the most reasonable explana

tion for the import substitution syndrome is that it is a response to a
real or imagined shortage of entrepreneurship and that it permits time
through informal learning-by-doing or more formal educational processes for
this entrepreneurial capacity to develop.

1

In terms of our Diagram I, this means that although the techno
logical shelf may look as indicated by curve

ss,

the actual choices available

to the developing country during the import substitution phase are more
aptly described by S'S'.

In other words, due to the inadequate state of

1some few countries, like Malaysia, with command over a very strong
and reliable natural resources base, may be able to avoid such a phase al
together. Moreover, there clearly exist better and worse (i.e. less and
more costly) import substitution packages to choose from, e.g. comparing
Brazil and Ghana, but we cannot expand on this very interesting subject
in the context of the present paper.

.-.. 3..,

entrepreneurial capacity during the early post-independence period of
physical controls, the efficiency of the operation per unit of capital in
the borrowing country is likely to be substantially below that in the lending
This is likely to be more true the more capital-intensive the im•

country.

port, i.e. the further removed from the cultural inheritance and economic
experience of the borrower.

Such technological imports are often accom

panied by imported engineers, even managers and supervisors--adding up to
whay is often called a turn-key project.

The most advanced and sophisti

cated technology can, of course, be made to "work," in the physical sense,
even in the most backward developing economy.

But a shiny new plant im

bedded in a society many decades distant is bound to be substantially less
efficient.

This is true for a thousand direct reasons, such as the absence

of even minimal skilled labor supplies, domestic subcontracting and repair
and maintenance possibilities, as well as for many more subtle sociological
reasons which enter into the total milieu in which the plant is asked to
operate.

The more sophisticated and removed from the rest of the economy

the technologica 1 transplant, in other words, the greater the relative in
efficiency, as indicated by the shape of the S'S' cur.ve.
If and when the economy then moves away from the import substitu
tion phase and enters into the second phase of liberalization and export
substitution, a second important, if unintentional, type of innovation is
likely to make its appearance, namely a reduction in the extent of the in
efficiency of the original transplanted technology.

Call it X-efficiency

if you like, but the cost of the pure transplantation is likely to be re
duced, quite unintentionally, ioe. l~rgely as a result of factors external
to the profit maximizing behavior of the productive unit itself.

This
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increase in productive efficiency over time will increase in quantitative
significance as the import-substitution hothouse temperature is gradually
turned down and a more competitive economy emerges.

In Diagram I the

effects of gradual enhancement of efficiency may be represented by the
arrows tending, over time, to move S'S I back towards the origina 1 SS
1
. .
position.

Another more conscious and quantitatively more important type of
innovation begins to gather importance during this same second phase of
transition.

This phenomenon may be called innovational assimilation, i.e.

innovating "on top of" imported technology in the direction of using rela

tively more of the abundant unskilled labor supply.

As the economy shifts

from a natural resource based growth pattern in the import substitution
phase, to a human resource based system in the export substitution phase,

this means an increasing sensitivity to the continuously changing factor
endowment, first in terms of the efficient utilization of the domestic un•
skilled labor force, and later in terms of the incorporation of growing
domestic

skills and ingenuity.

In other words, the appropriate type of

technology finally in place must be one in which not only the initial
choice from the shelf but also the adaptations and adjustments consciously
made thereafter in response to changing domestic resource and capability
constraints, play an important role.
The more liberalized the economy, in terms of the government I s per
forming a catalytic role through the market, by indirect means, rather than
trying to impose resource allocation by direct controls, the better the
chances that the millions of dispersed decision-makers can be induced, by
1
A more sophisticated analysis, differentiating between the labor
and capital-saving nature of this move, depending on the region in which
the economy is operating, is possible, but will not be introduced here.
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the sheer force of profit maximization, to make the "right" decisions.

Even

in the absence of technological change, as long as surplus labor overhangs
the market, and the expectation is for even more of the same in the future,
we can expect little upward movement in real wages and little capital
deepening.

Superimposed on this is the aforementioned assimilation type

of innovationa 1 behavior which tends for the same reason to be slanted in
the labor-using direction.

In the typical labor surplus type of economy-•

or one likely to become one over the next decade (as is probably the case
in much of Africa)--all this means as much efficient accommodation of
pure labor services as possible.

1

Whether this will lead to a sectoral

output shift in favor of labor intensive export commodities or a mix pre
dominantly addressed to the domestic market, of course, depends, ceteris
paribus, on the type, e.g., size, of the economy.

No strong generaliza

tion as to the relative importance of shifts in output mix vs. changes in
technology for given mixes is likely to be valid.

It should be clear,

however, that the important issue is that the search for innovation can
now be considered a conscious activity of the individual entrepreneur--and
given the combination of more realistic relative price signals after
liberalization and given greater entrepreneurial capacity--that it is likely
to be directed towards various forms of indigenous capital stretching types
of technological change on top of the imported technology.

Such capital

stretching can be represented by a reduction in the capital coefficient per
unit of output.

The effective post-assimilation set of unit technologies,

i.e. after domestic assimilation, may thus be represented by curve S"S",
1
It is important to emphasize the word "efficient" since we are
not concerned here with the possible legitimate objective of employment
creation as a separate social goal to be traded off against output.
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with the strength of the indigenous labor-using innovative effort indicated
by the amount of the "downward" shift in the capital coefficient.

It should be noted here that a negatively sloped technology shelf,
e.g. SS, representing pure technological transplantation, permits, as you
move to the left, higher labor productivity levels, but only at increasing
capital cost.

In a country characterized by capital scarcity this may

mean increased technical unemployment (a la Eckaus) and hence a lower value
of per capita income for the economy--in spite of the higher level of labor
productivity achieved.

Domestic capital stretching however, can materially

affect that situation by enabling more workers to be employed per unit of
the capital stock.

If the post-assimilation unit technology set, e.g.

S"S", is upward sloping, as the economy moves to the left by first borrowing

abroad and then innovating domestically on top of that borrowed technology,
higher labor productivity levels become consistent with lower capital-output
ratios.
In summary, once the overall policy setting, as described in Sec
tion I has turned more favorable and permitted the economy to enter the
second phase of transition, it is this indigenous capital-stretching capacity
which we consider to be of the greatest importance--especially for the con•
temporary developing economy facing the formidable labor force explosion
predicted for the 70 1 s and BO's.

It is in this specific area also where

the skepticism of planners, engineers, and aid officials generally is
most pronounced--especially with respect to the range of technological
choice really available when all the dust has settled.

Using mostly his

torical examples from the Jaµanese case, we will attempt to demonstrate the
existence and potential importance of such capital-stretching innovations
for the contemporary developing country, in Section III.
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ill
As has been pointed out by many observers, including Allen and Lock•
wood 1 the most significant feature of the Japanese landscape in the early
Meiji period--following hard on two centuries of self-imposed, nearly
complete, isolation--was her ability to choose relatively freely from among
the items on the technological shelf perfected in the West.

The reopening

of foreign trade and the resumption of other related contacts, especially
the flow of technical personnel in both directions, led immediately to the
stimulation of technological change by direct borrowing.

But while the

Japanese have often been characterized as possessing a consummate ability
to copy and imitate, it is noteworthy that, in fact, very soon the majority
of domestic innovation activity "consisted of the adaptation of foreign
techniques to domestic conditions • 112

The reasons for this relatively early move to a responsiveness of
the industrial sector's technology to domestic endowment conditions are
complicated and cannot be dealt with satisfactorily within the scope of

this paper.

Suffice it to say that post-Restoration Japan did not engage

in very extensive or prolonger import-substitution policies--partly because
extra-territoriality deprived her of the ability to establish strong pro
tective import barriers, and partly because the government quite early
1George c. Allen, Japanese Industrialization: Its Recent Develop•
ment and Present Conditions, New York: Institute of Pacific Relations,
1940; W. W. Lockwood, Economic Development of Japan, 1868-1928, Prince
ton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1954.
2
M. Miyamoto, Y. Sakudo and Y. Yasuba, "Economic Development in
Pre-Industria 1 Japan: 1859-1894, 11 Journa 1 of Economic History, December
1965 1 p. 557. The same authors also report (p. 563) that similar capital
or land stretching innovations took place during the same period in the
agricultural sector, mainly via new cultivation methods on the intensive
margin.
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thought it more efficient to wo·.1:.·k through the market, i.e. by using taxes
and subsidies, rather than through extensive controls and government owner
ship.

Those government plants in directly productive areas which were es

tablished during the immediate post-Restoration period were viewed mainly
as pilot projects and sold off to private interests by 1890.
moved relatively quickly into the second

Thus Japan

phase of transition.

In assessing the importance of capital stretching innovations,
i.e. innovations which move the actual production shelf down to position
S"S" in Diagram I, it may be useful to recognize distinctions between in

novations relating to the machine proper; innovations relating to the pro
duction process as a whole, emphasizing the importance of activities within
the plant but peripheral to the machine; and innovations with respect to
the production process as a whole, emphasizing plant size and organization
at various stages of that process.
With respect to machine-related capital stretching innovations,
the simplest and quantitatively probably most important example was the
running of imported U.K. and U.Se machinery at rates and speed eubstan~
tially in excess of those used abroad.

For example, once the kerosene

lamp made night work possible, spitming could be done on two, sometimes
three shifts daily with but two or three rest days a month.

This meant

that the average work week per machine was two to three times that encoun
tered in the c~untry of origin; and, since physical depreciation is much
less important than economic obsolcs,:::ence, using a machine twice as inten
sively does not wear it out twice as fast.

This heavy use of machinery

typical of the 19th century Japanese indust:rial sector meant that the
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normal gap between the physical and economic life of a machine was sub
stantially narrowed and capita 1 was considerably "stretched. 11
Moreover,

there was in evidence a related speed-up of the very

same spinning machines.

By running the machines at faster speeds and/or

by substituting cheaper raw materials, i.e. raw cotton--and making up for
it by increasing the number of women to handle the resultant increase in
the number of broken threads--an additional major saving in capital could
be achieved:
Certain differences in the industries of the two countries
are important and must be noted.
tially different.

The raw material is essen

Though the Japanese do use some American

raw cotton, the bulk of their cotton is from India and is of
shorter staple, more likely to breakage ••• and requiring more
labor to put it through the machinery.

The yarn spun has much

more of the coarser counts that require more labor ••• By adding
more labor it is run somewhat faster than American practice •••
All of these factors are in some way related to the cheap
labor policy.

They are there because the labor is cheap. 1

Japanese spindles were equipped with a 7/8 inch instead of a one inch
front roll to accommodate the shorter staple cotton when operated at
higher speeds.
For these several reasons, i.e. differences in the yarn count and
differences in the speed of the machine, as well as differences in the
number of shifts, we find that there was a very marked substitution between
capital and labor in the cotton spinning industry.

For example, Orchard

1
John E. Orchard, Japan's Ec9nomic Position, New York:
Hill Book Co., Inc., 1930, p. 367~

McGraw

reports that a competent Japanese spinner working on a 20 yarn count
operated from 300 to 400 spindles, while an American spinner on the same
count yarn tended from 1,020 to 2,688 spindles, that is, between 2 1/2
.
and a 1most 7 ti.mes
as many. 1

As the U.S. Tariff Commission reported:

In order to distribute the fixed overhead charges in the
way of high interest and depreciation costs, and to earn the
large amounts needed to pay a normal rate of dividend, every
effort has been made to obtain the largest possible output
from the expensive equipment and plant.

Machinery is there

fore run at high speed, and almost since their inception the
Japanese spinning mills have been operated night and day,
employing two 12-hour shifts (22 actual working hours) for
an average of 27 days a montho 2

Here again given a standard count of yarn, the average Japanese spinner
is seen as tending 240 spindles, while the American counterpart on the same
machine tends about 1,000 spindleso

As late as 1932 weekly man-hours per

11 000 homogeneous, spindles of the same quality ranged from 328. 8 in Japan
to 164.8 in the United Kingdom and 143.1 in the United States. 3

A somewhat similar story can be told with respect to cotton weaving.
Once again,

the high cost of mill construction is considerably reduced
if you consider the hours during which the mill is being put
to effective use.

So far in Japan the wheels have turned

1
.Qe.. ill•, p. 367.
2
The Japanese Cotton Industry and Trade, U.S. Tariff Commission,
Government Printing Office, Washington, 1921, p. 99.
3
The World Textile Industry: Economic and Social Problems, Vol. 1,
International Labour Office, Geneva, 1937, p" 209.
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round during 20 out of 24 hours, while in Europe Qnly 8
hours are being worked.

Effective working time in England

is less than 38 hours per week, as 2 hours out of these are
devoted to cleaning; this is done in Japan after working
hours.

1

Again the U.S. Tariff Commission reports that "in weaving staple cotton
sheetings, the ordinary Japanese weaver seldom operates more than two
plain looms, while the American weaver, with perhaps some assistance in
supplying fresh bobbins, normally tends from 8 to 10 plain looms. 112
Perhaps the most convincing evidence that these adjustments along
the machines proper constituted a rational response to very marked dif•

ferences in factor endowments was that in weaving, in contrast to spinning,
the latest automatic equipment from abroad was not, in fact, invariably

imported.

Quite frequently non-automatic looms were taken from the shelf

instead, permitting more stretching than would have been possible in the
case of technologies to the left along that same shelf.

Unlike some of

the contemporary less developed countries, Japan clearly did not wish to

import ahead of its entrepreneurial and skilled labor capacities.

3

As the

Tariff Commission put it,
the price of the automatic loom is more than twice that of
the plain loom, which, with the additional expense involved
in the importation from the United States or Great Britain,

1
Arnolds. Pearse, Japan and China, Cotton Industry Report, Inter•
national Federation of Master Cotton Spinners' and Manufacturers' Associa
tion, Manchester, 1929 1 p. 86.
2
The Japanese Cotton Industry and Trade, .QQ.• cit., p. 100.
3
The U.S. Tariff Commission (Qp_" cit., p. 116) reported that a ship~
ment of automatic looms, imported shortly after the turn of the century, had
been found so difficult to operate, that) after removing the batteries and
warp-stop motions, they were instead run as plain looms, two looms to a
weaver.

-17made the total outlay too high in a country where the interest
charges on money were relatively much higher than the cost of
labor.

Japanese mill managers have, therefore, hitherto pre

ferred to employ more workers and to forego the more labor
saving but more expensive machinery, in contrast to the situa
tion in the United States where the high-priced labor is
economized rather than the machinery.

1

Taking cotton spinning and plain loom weaving on similar products together,
they concluded, in summary, that

the average Japanese spinner or weaver tends about one-fourth
the number of spindles or looms usually assigned to one person
in an American mi lL

A comparison of the tota 1 number of per

sons employed in the two countries to operate individual plants
of similar size, and, viewed more broadly, a comparison of the
total number of persons employed in the whole American indus
try, per 1,000 spindles, with the number that would be re
quired on the similar balanced basis under the Japanese condi
tions, confirms the general relation observed, that the
Japanese mills require between three and one-half and four
2
.
·
·
times
as many operatives
as t h e American.

In the case of silk production? which together with cotton, made
up more than 70 percent of total industrial output until the turn of the

l.rhe Japanese Cot ton Industry and Trai!!:_, .s2• cit., p. 116. A re lated
interesting example of technical flexibility far beyond what most engineers
are willing to admit to is provided by the Toyoda automatic loom, one of
the few indigenous Japanese inventions in this area. Subsequently manu
factured by Platt's and Oldham 1 s under a Japanese patent, it was advertised to require 20 girls per loom in England; 50 girls had always been
used in Japan.
2

Ibid., Po 1130
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century, we have similar evidence of the ability to innovate in a capital
stretching direction on the machine proper.

In raw silk, for example, the

Japanese employed more than twice as many girls as did the reeling basins
in Italy.

In other areas, well into the twentieth century, Japanese rail·

ways employed 19 workers per mile of track compared with 7 in the

u.s. 1

In

the production of printed goods, the following episodal account may be in
structive:
Recently, a Japanese manufacturer of plain linoleum decided
to undertake the production of printed goods.

He dispatched

a representative to the United States to purchase the necessary
equipment.

The representative was familiar with the modern

linoleum printing machine, printing several colors at one time
and turning out as much as 15,000 square yards in 9 hours, but
he considered it too expensive a piece of equipment, especially
since his labor was being paid only about 50 cents a day, and
so he sought out, in an American plant, an old hand block
printing outfit.

It was not for sale.

about in a storeroom of the factory~

Its parts were lying
Some of them were 40

years old, and the whole outfit had been discarded 15 years be•
fore.

But the Japanese representative purchased it and had it

shipped to Japan.

In the immediate outlay of capital he saved

money, for he purchased the old equipment at the price of a
printing machine or even below the prices of a new hand outfit,
but he installed in his plant equipment that could only have been
disposed of as junk in the United States.
1
0rchard,

.QE.•

ill•,

p. 375.

He started in Japan
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a new industry in a stage of technical development that had be
come obsolete years before in the older industrial countries. 1
Many of the extra workers in Japanese plants are not engaged on
the machine proper, but in what might be called machine-periphera 1 or
handling activities.
belts are devised.

In place of mechanical conveyor belts, human conveyor
Packaging is more often done by hand.

As Orchard again

reports, "at one of the largest copper smelters in Japan, clay for the
lining of the furnaces is carried down from a nearby hillside on the backs
of women.

At the plant of the Tokyo Gas Company, coke is put into bags by

hand and then carried by coolies, some of them women, to the barges in the
adjacent canal.

Coal, even in the larger Tokyo plants, is unloaded by

hand and carried in baskets to the power houses." 2

The ability to sub-

stitute labor for capital in such activities peripheral to the machine
proper apparently existed and the quantitative incidence was substantial.
Very often such activities were machine paced in the Hirschman sense, i.e.
while they might have looked wasteful to the untrained Western eye, they
were, in fact, paced by well-spaced machinery as part of the same produc
tion line which contained large numbers of unskilled laborers. 3

A third type of capital-stretching innovation of which much use was
made in historical Jap~n is what might be called the plant-saving variety.
This is oft~n characterized by the co~existence of different historical
stages of production in the same industry.
1
Orchard, .22•
2

ill•,

Raw silk production and cotton

p. 246.

.!.!2!9... , Po 255.
3
This is very similar to contemporary methods of construction with
the use of reinforced concrete in India and Pakistan. Here a cement mixer
is linked to the final pouring of the concrete by a long chain of workers
passing the cement from hand to hand; the cement is put in place just be
fo~e it is ready to cool and harden.
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weaving represent outstanding examples.

In the former industry silkworm

rearing, and cocoon production were handled mainly by farmers' wives in
small home-made sheds,

extensions of the rural households.

In cotton

weaving, most of the yarn was "put out" to farm households, with individual
looms dispersed in farm houses and worksheds.

But even in the more modern

factory-style spinning industry, preparatory and finishing processes were
carried out largely at the cottage level.
This rather remarkable survival of domestic industry on a subcon
tracting basis must be explained largely in terms of the exploitation of

complementarities between many small labor-intensive operating units and
the large industrial management unit.

The traditional merchant middleman,

as a representative of the sub-contracting unit, served as both supplier
and market for the goods to be worked up domestically.

A specialization

of functions as between workshops, even as between the members of a given
family, developed.

One-roof economies could be achieved in this fashion,

i.e. by using cheap labor in cooperation with old fashioned machinery at
the workshop level, while economies of scale could be achieved in the financing, purchasing and merchandising stages. 1 The continued relative impor•
tance of this household type of enterprise is quite remarkable; cottage
style industry contributed more than 2/3 of industrial output in 1878,
almost 60 percent in 1895, and retained substantial importance well into

the twentieth century.

Not only lacquerware, pottery, porcelain, sake,

fruit and fish canning but also such new consumer goods coming to the fore
/

111

Sornetimes even a single part is not completed in one shop or home
but is shaped in one and painted or plated in another." H. G. Aubrey,
"Small Industry in Economic Development," Social Research, September 1951.
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over time as bicycles, electric lamps and rubber, were to exhibit the same
characteristics.
Plant amounts to more than 50 percent of total investment in plant
and equipment in most countries.

The ability to utilize households for

putting-out operations and thus reduce expenditures on plant undoubtedly
amounted to a major kind of capital stretching innovation.

By deploying

familiar but improving machinery over large numbers of scattered mini-plants,
large amounts of unskilled labor could be deployed in both direct produc
tion and in satisfying the resulting increased demand for transportation
and handling activitieso
In this fashion, Japanese entrepreneurs were able to, first, incor
porate pure labor services and, later, domestic ingenuity and skills in the
industrial production processes, largely for exporto
porary examples of capital-stretching may be cited.

Other, more contem•
In Taiwan, for example,

after the liberalization policies of the early 60's substantially reduced
distortions in the exchange rate, the interest rate, and the intersectoral
terms of trade, marked labor-using innovations took place in the textile)
electronics, and food processing industries.

Large scale mushroom and

asparagus production as agricultural by-employment (similar to silk in
Japan), combined with canning processes at the factory level utilizing
female labor with greater intensity than anywhere else, is one example.
While, in 1955, traditional exports 7 mainly sugar and rice, still amounted
to 76 percent of total exports, by 1968 this had shrunk to 8 percent of a
much larger totalo
cultural

Meanwhile export substitution in the form of new agri

products and, increasingly with ti.me: products embodying a large

volume· of pure labor services has taken hold~

The ultimate expression of

..zz.,
the latter trend can be found in the Kaohsiung Export Processing Zone, a
tariff-free area into which, largely under subcontracting arrangements with
Japanese or American firms, raw materials are imported and reexported after
value in the form mainly of unskilled labor has been added.

Largely as a

consequence of plant and machinery saving technological change of this
type, Taiwan is now reliably reported to be experiencing

an unskilled

labor shortage and may be one of the very few LDC's which can face its in
evitable labor force explosion ahead with some equanimity.
A similar trend has been in the making in South Korea.

Devaluation

in 1963 and interest rate reform in 1964 laid the basis for major changes
in the output mix as well as in the technology employed in given industries.
In silk spinning, for example, 33 percent more workers are reported em
ployed per unit of capital than in contemporary Japan.

A bonded export

processing scheme, built on the same international subcontracting principle
as Taiwan's now yields close to 20 percent of an export volume which itself
has been rising at an almost incredible 30-40 percent annual rate over the
past three years.

In 1962 land-based food stuffs and raw materials made

up 75 percent of total exports while labor-based light manufacturing indus
tries as a whole, including plywood, raw silk, cotton textile, wigs and
footwear amounted to 15 percento

By 1968 the situation had been completely

reversed, with 77 percent of the exports in manufacturing and only 14.5
percent in foodstuffs, livestock and raw materials.

It should, moreover,

be noted that small-scale manufacturing exports, i.e. in units of less than

10 workers, undoubtedly the most labor--intensive part of the spectrum,
grew from 18.6 percent of the total in 1963 to 31.4 percent in 1968.

-23In summary, the typical contemporar y LDC may be viewed as moving
first through an import substitutio n phase in which pure technologic al trans
plantation is likely to be the order of the day, while shortages in domestic
entrepreneu rial capacity and other economic overheads are being repaired.
Then, as the hothouse temperature is gradually reduced and the economy
moves towards greater efficiency with the help of various liberalizati on
policies, labor-using types of technologic al change, both of the uninten
tional and of the intentional variety, assume increasing importance.

In

this phase the famous conflict between output and employment objectives
in industrial development may be subject to fundamental challenge.

Both

the historical experience of Japan and that of Taiwan and Korea in recent

years illustrate that the current wide-spread skepticism concerning the
supposed tyranny of the rigid technical coefficient s may be seriously in
error.

This error derives in the main from an underestima te of the poten•

tial inventivene ss of indigenous entrepreneu rs, once they are given access,
at a price, to the required inputso

And this is no trivial matter.

For if

our skepticism here is unwarranted , this would be among the most powerful
arguments for acceleratin g the current, rather slow, trend towards liberali
zation and the erosion of the substantial shadow price/marke t price differen•
tials in factor and commodity markets.

